We shall show how to treat shared belief revision and reference management in the process of dialogues by distinguishing three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared discourse referents, and the shared belief referent, using an extended version of Discourse Representation Theory, called Hyper-DRS, which can represent shared beliefs semantically in a notation based on hyper-sets (sets in non-well-founded set theory).
Introduction
Belief sharing in dialogue necessarily involves circular structures, since shared beliefs have circular structures. [1] 's theory of non-well-founded sets or hyper-sets makes it possible to encode such circular structures in first-order fixed point equations, whose solution is guaranteed by his solution lemma. By adopting [1] 's theory, we extend the expressibility of Discourse Representation Structures, called Hyper-DRS(firstly proposed in [14, 13] ), of [9, 8, 10 , 2]'s Discourse Representation Theory, henceforth DRT. (See also [12] for another version of self-referential DRS and its semantics). This extension takes the form of introducing three new types of discourse referents, which we will show reflect our intuitions about dialogue processes. In this paper, we shall show how to treat shared belief revision and reference management in the process of dialogues by distinguishing three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared discourse referents, and the shared belief referent. Shared discourse referents play a role in preserving the topic of dialogues, and shared belief referents are used to convert circular propositions into first-order equational systems, and we can update and revise a circular proposition by hanging propositions on and taking propositions from shared discourse referents appearing in it. Thus, the three types of discourse referents are basic devices for the management of shared beliefs. In the context of shared belief revision, we can also characterize the three types of discourse referents in terms of the notion of accessibility and life span. The shared belief referent and standard discourse referents can not be accessed by both conversants. The conversants can access shared discourse referents, and each conversant can access standard discourse referents which are introduced by herself. Shared discourse referents and the shared belief referents can not be deleted and forgotten when shared beliefs are revised or deleted, i.e., the life span of shared belief referents is the longest in revision processes of discourse representation structures, and the life span of shared discourse referents is longer than that of standard discourse referents in their revision processes. Furthermore, we can explain the connection between shared belief revision, reference management, and dialogue process, and give a mothod of evaluation of dialogue in terms of successfulness in information sharing.
As a result, our extended version of DRT with Hyper-DRS's can treat shared beliefs as first-order equational systems, which, being a finite representation of inherently infinite structures, allow us to simulate, and evaluate processes of shared belief revision and reference management in dialogue.
In section 2 we consider a probeim of the type of disourse referents connected to dialogue evaluation. In section 3 we propose Hyper-DRS and their construction procedure from dialogue by distinguishing shared belief referernts from the other types of discourse referents. In section 4 we distinguish and characterize shared discourse referents. In section 5 we propose a procedure for shared belief revion based on Hyper-DRS and the distinction of the three types of discourse referents in dialogue.
A Problem of the Type of Discourse Referents concering Dialogue Evaluation
Many scholars ([5] , [7] ) show that human understanding of definite reference depends on shared belief. However, according to [14] , there are some levels of shared belief exploited for definite reference in human dialogues. For example, consider the following exchange where John and Mary are talking about a scene in a park, and they know Bill and Bob.
( (1), the referents which they perceive and intend to refer to are Bill and Bob, the actual individuals are David and Martin, and there is a man they are talking about, who does not exist in the real world. This last referent makes the dialogue successful in spite of the disparity involved in the real situation. We call this kind of referents shared discourse referents.
Shared discourse referents can be used even when they bear no value.
(2) John: Who is running over there?
Mary: It's Bill.
In this example, Mary can refer to the referent introduced by John and the dialogue is successful, even when she does not actually share the referent John intends to refer to. In other words, a referent of this kind behaves like a discourse referent in that it is not intended to refer to any particular object ([11] ). And, shared discourse referents are preserved all through a dialogue, and if they are not preserved, then the dialogue fails. This use of 'Who?' is almost equivalent to `Pardon?'. In this case, we can't use an anaphora. That is, the first part of dialogue (3) failed, and the cause of the failure is the conversants' failure to share discourse referents. For use of an anaphora is impossible.
In (1), at first John and Mary disagreed as to their shared referent but eventually they came to an greement. They changed their shared belief through the conversation. However, they did not change the shared discourse referent: that same thing they were talking about. Shared discourse referents are not changed throughout a dialogue. By contrast, other information may be revised. Therefore, we propose the following principles of dialogue based on this observation.
• Shared discourse referents make dialogues successful, and are not changed throughout a dialogue.
• A dialogue fails and repair question like 'Pardon?' is used in order to establish shared discourse referents.
• The rest of the shared information may be revised through a dialogue.
Thus, we should include shared discourse referents in our formalization of shared information revision in order to treat dialogues properly. In the next section, we will formalize shared discourse referents and revision of shared belief.
Discourse Referents as Shared Belief Denoting Devices
In this section, we propose a treatment of shared belief by introducing a discourse referent as shared belief denoting device, which is similar to DRT's treatment of anaphora and donkey sentences ( [9] ), and by translating shared belief into an equational system of propositions, as proposed by [4] and [3] . In Discourse Representation Theory, We can augment information about indefinite objects by introducing discourse referents, which play the role of a peg on which we hang new information. Similarly, we can revise shared belief through Hyper-DRS by regarding shared belief as a kind of discourse referents. [3, 4, 6] formalize shared belief and shared belief propositions as solutions of equational systems of propositions. Following them, we can formalize John and Mary's shared belief or shared information about a proposition 'Bill is running' as follows:
Suppose that John and Mary revised their shared belief by a conversation as in (5), (5) the shared belief will be what is by (4) . How can we formulate this updating process of shared beliefs? We propose to treat shared belief as a kind of discourse referents. Namely, a shared belief is translated into a discourse referent satisfying an equational system of propositions containing the new discourse referent, as in (6) .
Revising a shared belief amounts to revising this equational system of propositions. Thus we have only to add to this system a new piece of shared information linearly, as in (6) . where q is a newly introduced discourse referent. More formally, we propose Hyper-DRS which can represent such circular propositions as follows. This method is similar to DRT's treatment of anaphora and donkey sentences ([9] ). We can augment information about indefinite objects by introducing discourse referents, which play the role of a peg on which we hang new information. Therefore, we can revise shared beliefs through the Hyper-DRS by taking shared beliefs as a kind of discourse referents. We call this type of discourse referents shared belief referents. Thus, we have introduced shared belief referents syntactically. Can we define the semantics for them? According to [4] and [3] , in hyper-universe introduced by [1] , each equational system of propositions has a unique solution by the Solution Lemma. When we define a class of propositions co-inductively, we can define a hyper-class of propositions containing circular propositions. We can give the semantics of shared belief referents, using the technique of hyper-sets, as follows. In what follows, we will continue task of differentiating the three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared discourse referents, and shared belief referents, and we can show how to update shared beliefs by a dialogue in terms of Discourse Representation Theory. And, we shall give a solution to the proposed problems in section 2.
Shared Discourse Referents
The three types of discourse referents introduced in the previous section shares the property that they play a role in assuring the existence of the denoted object just like eigen variables. However, we can further differentiate the three types of discourse referents. So far we have introduced shared discourse referents and shared belief referents. In this section, we shall argue on the distinction between standard discourse referents and shared discourse referents in terms of accessibility and life span.
In DRT accessibility between discourse referents is defined in terms of the structure of DRS. This concept reflects the use of anaphora in linguistics. We use the term 'accessible' also for the accessibility of anaphora between utterances by conversants. For example, the following dialogue is anomalous. Mary: * He is the one we met yesterday.
In DRT 'a man' introduces a new discourse referent into the DRS of (7), but (7) shows that standard discourse referents introduced by one of the conversants are not accessible from the other of the conversants, since Mary cannot use 'he' in order to refer to 'a man'. The following is preferable to (7) . (8) (7) and (8) show that conversants distinguish between shared and unshared discourse referents by their accessibility. This accessibility can be encoded by the structure of a Hyper-DRS. Shared discourse referents are registered in the top domain, but unshared discourse referents are in an embedded domain, as follows. Shared discourse referents are bound by the meta-condition 'talking ..about (C , x) ' which represents that the discourse referent x is shared in the dialogue by the group of conversants C. And, sharing of discourse referents can be carried out by the following procedures on the Hyper-DRS.
Procedure 2 Given a Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint, (i) If X says co, then cond(p) := cond(p) U {believe(X, q), K(q)}, dom(p) := dom(p) U {q}, where q is a new discourse referent, and K(q) is the Hyper-DRS of cp.
( 
(v) If X says 'I know what you are talking about', then dom(p) := dom(p) U {z}, and cond(q) := dom(q) U {x = z}, where z is a new discourse referent and x is the last discourse referent in dom(q).

0
We can encode this distinction by accessibility of anaphora between conversants into the structure of Hyper-DRS's. In other words, we can define two types of discourse referents in Discourse Representation Theory.
The two types can be distinguished in terms of the life span of discourse referents. Suppose that John and Mary disagreed on the referential identity of Bill and Bob. To treat this change from disagreement to agreement, the conversant must revise her belief or at least the shared beliefs. In (10) We must explain how to delete propositions to be abandoned. In (10) , Mary revised her belief or shared belief in response to John's previous explanation 'Bob has gone to Hongkong.' This justifies the assertion 'no' against 'he is Bob.' In other words, John's 'no' marks the assertion 'he is Bob' as deletable, and when the ground 'Bob has gone to Hongkong' of John's 'no' has been shared, the marked assertioǹ he is Bob' must be deleted. Furthermore, we must delete Mary's attitude 'no' against 'Bill is running,' since Mary's 'no' grounds on 'he is Bob,' and this ground is refuted by John's 'no' and its ground 'Bob has gone...' It is to be noted that deletable conditions are not conditions about the content, but conversants' A B u P1, X1 , P2, P3, X2 P4, P5, X3 P6 Self(A); Other(B); Now(u) believe (A, q); believe(B, q) believe(A, p1 ); talking_about ({A,B},x1) As the result, the following Hyper-DRS of (10) is constructed.
q:
It should be noted that the shared discourse referent and the shared belief referent can not be deleted and forgotten if the shared beliefs are revised and deleted. Therefore, the life span of shared discourse referents and shared belief referents are the longest in revision processes of Hyper-DRS's.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown detailed structures of reference in dialogues and shared belief revision from the viewpoint of dialogue as shared belief revision, by extending DRS to Hyper-DRS. We have distinguished and characterized three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared discourse referents, and shared belief referents, and showed how they realize dialogues as processes of shared belief revision. Shared discourse referents play roles in preserving the topic of dialogues, and shared belief discourse referents make circular propositions into first-order equational systems, and we can update and revise the circular propositions. Conversants can access only shared discourse referents except for discourse referents introduced by her own moves. Shared belief referents have the longest life span in the dialogues. Secondly, shared discourse referents live longer than standard discourse referents. They are deleted only if the dialogue fails and a repair question like Pardon?' is induced. Shared belief revision is an action affecting only propositional attitudes. So shared belief referents and shared discourse referents are not affected by any shared belief revision in dialogues. Thus, the three types of discourse referents are foundamental devices for management of shared beliefs.
- (Talking _about, {x, y}, z; 1), p; 1) , (True, p; 0), p, q), x; 1) , (Other, x; 1) , (Now, i; 1) , (Bill, x; 1) , (Bob, x; 1) or - (Included, i, ; 1) , (Overlap, i, ; 1) , (Included, i, i'; 0) , (Overlap, i, i'; For any natural number n,
• no proposition and its dual are in A4 (n),
• (Self, x; 1), (Other, y; 1), (N ow, i; 1) E M(0),
• if (A, I') E A4(n) then F C M(n),
• if (Because, p, q; 1) , q E M(n), then p E M(n),
• no (Because, p, q; 1) and (Because, p, 1) are in M(n),
• no (Because, p, q; 1) and (Because, 15, q; 1) are in M(n),
• if (R, x; 1) , (R, y; 1) E M(n) and R E {Self, Other, Now} , then x = y,
• if (Overlap, i, j; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, j, i; 1) E M(n) ,
• if (Included, j; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, i, j; 1) , E M(n),
• if (Overlap, j; 0) E M(n) then (Included, i, j; 0) , E M(n),
• if (Overlap, i, j; 1) , (Included, j, k; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, i, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (Included, i, j; 1) , (Included, j, k; 1) E M(n) then (Included, i, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (Included, i, j; 1) , (Included, j, i; 1) E M(n) then i = j,
• if a temporal object k is in M(n) then (Included, k, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (True, p; 1) E A4(n) then p E A4(n),
• if (True, p; 0) E M(n) then p M(n).
• if (Believe, x,,, p; 1) E M(n) then p E A4(m). 0
